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"DO YOU PROMISE TO LOVE, HONOR AND
EQUITABLY DIVIDE YOUR CELEBRITY
STATUS UPON DIVORCE?" A LOOK AT
THE DEVELOPMENT AND
APPLICATION OF NEW YORK'S EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION STATUTE
I. INTRODUCTION
Andy Warhol once said: "In the future, everyone will be famous for
fifteen minutes."' If that fifteen minutes occurs during one's marriage
and is aided by one's spouse, then New York courts will consider the
fame a part of the marital property and upon dissolution, subject to equi-
table distribution. In Golub v. Golub 2 actress Marisa Berenson and attor-
ney A. Richard Golub divorced after a four year marriage. After
entering a joint decree of divorce, the court set about equitably dividing
the couple's marital assets and was faced with the issue of what was
"marital property." 3
In briefs submitted in the property distribution phase, Golub sought
to include Berenson's increased celebrity status4 as part of the marital
property. Golub contended that Berenson's status as an actress and
model was a business capable of valuation and that her earning capacity
increased during the marriage as a result of his efforts and contributions.
Thus, her increased celebrity status should be considered marital prop-
erty and subject to equitable distribution.5 In addressing this argument,
1. See ULTRA VIOLET, FAMOUS FOR 15 MINUTES: MY YEARS WITH ANDY WARHOL
at 8 (1988).
2. 139 Misc. 2d 440, 527 N.Y.S.2d 946 (1988). The official reporter only published se-
lected portions of the opinion. The opinion was published in full in the New York Law Jour-
nal. Golub v. Golub, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 18, 1988, at 7, col. 1-4 and 13, col. 1-2.
3. Golub, N.Y.L.J. at 3, col. 3.
4. Golub contended that Berenson's celebrity status was a business which had appreci-
ated by approximately $152,000 during their marriage, of which he was entitled to 50% be-
cause of his direct and indirect contributions as Berenson's lawyer, business manager, and
personal manager. Golub listed over fifty ways in which he added to the increase in Berenson's
celebrity status, including reviewing and preparing three years of her tax returns, negotiating
acting and modeling contracts, and negotiating for the removal of a restraining order which
the federal government and the State of California had placed on any payments to Berenson
from the Screen Actors Guild. Post Trial Memorandum of A. Richard Golub at 12-30; Golub
v. Golub, 139 Misc. 2d 440, 527 N.Y.S.2d 946 (2706/86)(1988).
5. Post Trial Memorandum of A. Richard Golub at 5; Golub v. Golub, 139 Misc. 2d 440,
527 N.Y.S.2d 946 (2706/86)(1988).
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the court relied primarily on O'Brien v. O'Brien,6 where a professional
license and the resulting increased earning capacity acquired by one
spouse with the support of the other was included as part of the marital
property.7 In Golub, the court was faced with whether to extend the
O'Brien rule to include celebrity status.
The court accepted Golub's theory and held that an increase in Ber-
enson's celebrity status during the marriage, if that increase was aided by
Golub, was an increase in the marital property and thus subject to equi-
table distribution under New York law.' However, the court declined to
subject Berenson's increased celebrity status to equitable distribution be-
cause Golub offered no evidence at trial regarding the value of Beren-
son's career and because the court was not convinced that Golub had
given up any of his personal career opportunities to assist Berenson.9
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Actress/model Marisa Berenson and attorney A. Richard Golub
were married amidst much media and television coverage on February
14th, 1982-Valentine's Day. Both were accustomed to luxurious stan-
dards of living and brought to the marriage their own notoriety. Beren-
son, a noted film and television star, had been a model since she was a
teenager, appearing on the covers of such magazines as Vogue, Bazaar,
and Time. She was respected and admired in both the fashion and art
world, working not only in the United States but abroad as well. Beren-
son spoke several foreign languages fluently and had also authored a
book on fashion, entitled Dressing Up. 10 Moreover, she enjoyed recogni-
tion as the granddaughter of the famous couturier Elsa Schiaparelli.II
Golub was admitted to the New York State Bar in 1972 and was a
successful attorney in private practice. The year before his marriage to
Berenson, Golub's business grossed over $250,000 in fees.' 2 Formerly a
theatrical manager, he was well known both by the media and show busi-
ness personnel. Thus, many of his clients were celebrities whom he had
met during his previous career. 13 Just prior to his marriage, Golub was
6. 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985).
7. Id. at 580-81, 489 N.E.2d at 713, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 744.
8. Golub, 139 Misc. 2d at 447, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
9. Golub, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 18, 1988, at 13, col. 1.
10. M. BERENSON, DRESSING UP (1984).
11. Golub, 139 Misc. 2d at 441, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 947.
12. Golub, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 18, 1988, at 13, col. 1.
13. Id.
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in the public spotlight because of his participation in a highly publicized
trial involving Brooke Shields. 4
During their marriage, Berenson and Golub jointly bought and sold
several properties.' I While the couple's contributions to the first prop-
erty were relatively even, with Golub and Berenson contributing approxi-
mately fifty-six percent and forty-four percent respectively and jointly
assuming a then existing mortgage, the second marital residence was
purchased almost entirely by Golub. 6
From the start of their marriage, Berenson spent almost half of each
year in Europe. In September 1985, the couple leased a Paris apartment
towards which Golub contributed $32,500.17 The apartment, however,
was solely in Berenson's name and she had exclusive use of the prem-
ises.1 8 As with the marital residence, the Paris apartment was lavishly
decorated and furnished with antiques and expensive art objects. 9 While
Berenson was in Paris, Golub supervised housekeeping and care of Ber-
enson's daughter in the United States. He also supervised renovations
made to the marital estate and took charge of the negotiations and litiga-
tion involved in buying and selling the marital property.20
Berenson had three bank accounts. Only one of the accounts was in
her name alone. Most of her funds were deposited into the other two
accounts which she held jointly with Golub.2 Berenson and Golub pro-
duced evidence to show that they pooled their income, using their monies
interchangeably to pay for the marital properties, taxes, and general liv-
ing expenses.22 However, Golub made most of the monetary decisions
and assisted Berenson by organizing her financial affairs.23
The parties showed at trial that the marriage had been in decline
14. Golub, 139 Misc. 2d at 441, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 947.
15. Golub, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 18, 1988, at 7, col. 2.
16. The first property purchased by Golub and Berenson, a four story townhouse on East
83rd Street in Manhattan, was purchased by jointly assuming a then existing mortgage and
contributions of $75,065.61 by Golub and $58,000 by Berenson. When the property was sold
in February of 1984 for $950,000, the couple purchased a townhouse on East 64th Street,
$105,000 of which was paid by Golub with the remainder covered by a purchase money mort-
gage and a bridge loan. Golub, 139 Misc. 2d at 441, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 947.
17. Id.
18. Golub, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 18, 1988, at 7, col. 2.
19. Id. at 7, col. 2-3.
20. Golub, 139 Misc. 2d at 442, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
21. Berenson's three bank accounts were as follows: 1) the "A. Richard Golub Special
Account No. 2," 2) the "Echoes of Eternity" account, and 3) a Paris account. Golub had
signatory power on the first two accounts while the third account was held by Berenson indi-
vidually. Id. at 947.
22. The evidence included various checks as well as the parties' testimony. Id.
23. Id.
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since 1984.24 In 1986, the New York Supreme Court granted a dual de-
cree of divorce on the grounds of constructive abandonment and aban-
donment.25 Subsequently, the same court had the task of equitably
distributing the parties' marital property. The court considered, among
other things,26 the following assets: 1) the increase in the value of
24. Golub, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 18, 1988, at 7, col. 1.
25. Golub, 139 Misc. 2d at 441, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 947. Abandonment, or more commonly
desertion, is the willful and intentional leaving of one spouse without the intention of returning
and without the consent of the spouse abandoned. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 3 (5th ed.
1979). Constructive abandonment occurs where an existing cohabitation is ended by the mis-
conduct of one of the parties, provided that such misconduct is itself a ground for divorce.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 401 (5th ed. 1979).
26. The court also considered the following: 1) Berenson's request for maintenance; 2) the
Paris apartment; 3) the marital residence; 4) the furnishings in the marital residence and the
Paris apartment; and 5) two Andy Warhol paintings. In considering Berenson's request for
maintenance, the court looked to the statutory standards in § 236 of New York's Domestic
Relations Law. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney 1986). The court declined to award
Berenson maintenance, noting among other things that the Golubs' marriage was a short,
childless one; that both were in excellent health; that Berenson's "talent and beauty have ena-
bled her to become a substantial wage earner," Golub, 139 Misc. 2d at 442, 527 N.Y.S.2d at
948; and that her earnings had substantially appreciated during the marriage. The court con-
cluded that Berenson was fully able to maintain herself in the manner to which she had be-
come accustomed during her marriage to Golub. Id.
The court denied Golub's assertion that the Paris apartment should be included as part of
the marital property, citing the rule that a leasehold estate is not considered to be property for
purposes of equitable distribution. See Golub, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 18, 1988, at 7, col. 2-3.
In reference to the marital residence, Berenson claimed that she was entitled to 63.25% of
it based on her contributions, while Golub claimed that he should receive a 77.46% share
based on his contributions. Considering the fact that Berenson had not contributed to the
maintenance of the residence since the dissolution action commenced, and Golub's "greater
pride and commitment" to the residence as his home and office, the court gave Golub the
choice of either keeping the property and giving Berenson 50% of the value of the property
less costs or selling the property and splitting the proceeds equally. See Golub, N.Y.L.J., Mar.
18, 1988, at 13, col. 1-2.
Because no evidence was presented at trial to show when the furnishings, antiques, and
jewelry in the Paris apartment and the marital residence had been purchased, by whom, or for
what price, the court concluded that each party would get the personal property they pos-
sessed at the time. See Golub, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 18, 1988, at 7, col. 2-3.
Considering the Andy Warhol paintings, the court determined that Warhol gave the first
of the paintings, a portrait of Berenson, to her alone as a birthday gift and thus it was not
subject to distribution. In determining whether the second painting of a dollar sign was sepa-
rate or marital property, the court looked to the circumstances in which it was acquired. The
painting was handed to Golub while the couple was attending a holiday party. Considering
that both Berenson and Golub had longstanding friendships with Warhol, and that the paint-
ing was small enough to be handed to Berenson if it had been meant only for her, the court
determined that the painting, valued at approximately $12,000, had been given to both parties.
The court ordered that the painting either be sold with the proceeds being divided equally or
kept by Berenson upon a credit of 50% of its value to Golub. See Golub, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 18,
1988, at 7, col. 2-3.
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Golub's law practice during the marriage and 2) the increase in Beren-
son's celebrity status during the marriage.
In considering the increase in value of Golub's law practice, 27 the
court held that the increase was part of the marital assets despite the fact
that Berenson presented no direct evidence that she had aided this in-
crease by referring clients to Golub or otherwise. 28 The court noted that
Berenson's celebrity status attracted media attention to the couple and
enabled them to attend many star-studded and media-packed events.
The court stated: "In a practice such as [Golub's], this certainly would
have had some positive and perhaps lasting effect and should be consid-
ered as a contribution to the increase in the value of defendant's prac-
tice."'29 Relying on previous cases3" and on the fact that the Golubs'
marriage was short and childless, the court awarded Berenson ten per-
cent or $10,840 of the increased value of Golub's practice which accrued
during the marriage.31
Finally, the court decided the validity of Golub's post trial assertion
that the increase in the value of Berenson's celebrity status was marital
property. Golub asserted that he deserved part of the increase because it
was directly related to his efforts in organizing Berenson's financial af-
fairs and career as well as efforts in supervising the marital residence and
Berenson's child while she was out of the country.3 2 The court agreed
that increased celebrity status could be considered as marital property,
but declined to equitably divide the value of Berenson's increased celeb-
rity status because Golub had failed to present any evidence at trial as to
the value of Berenson's career or that he had given up personal opportu-
nities in generating this increase.33 The court was unwilling to rule on
any argument raised for the first time in post trial papers.34
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
In concluding that Berenson's celebrity status may be marital prop-
erty, the court noted that the law clearly considers professional licenses
27. Berenson's expert witness testified that Golub's practice had increased in value by
$108,400 between the time the marriage began and the time the dissolution proceeding com-
menced. Id. at 13, col. 1.
28. Post Trial Memorandum of A. Richard Golub at 31-32.
29. Golub, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 18, 1988, at 13, col. 1.
30. See infra notes 44-61 and accompanying text.
31. Golub, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 18, 1988 at 13, col. 1.
32. Id. at 7, col. 3.
33. Id. at 13, col. 1.
34. Id.
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in marital property divisions3" and that the law had already been ex-
tended to include academic degrees as well.36 In the cases establishing
these precedents, the courts stated that the value of the professional li-
cense or academic degree was not in the license or degree itself.37
Rather, the value was in the increased earning capacity the license or
degree afforded its holder.3" The degree was not itself divisible, but the
intangible opportunities that accompany it were divisible. 9 The court
further stated that professional licenses and academic degrees were logi-
cal extensions of the equitable distribution statute and noted that "the
right of a spouse to share in other valuable assets must be the next step
forward."'  Based on these findings, the court held that Golub's law
degree and subsequent practice fell squarely under the case law definition
of marital property. Accordingly, these were subject to equitable distri-
bution by the court.
The main issue the court analyzed was whether the rule could be
extended without adversely affecting a spouse who is married to a non-
professional when the marriage dissolved.4" The court indicated that
there were possibilities of unfair results. For example, inequitable distri-
bution would result as the nonprofessional spouse with a high earning
potential would reap an economic windfall while the other spouse would
be unfairly deprived. Therefore, the court concluded that "the skills of
an artisan, actor, professional athlete, or any person whose expertise in
his or her career has enabled him or her to become an exceptional wage
earner should be valued as marital property subject to equitable
distribution. 42
IV. PRIOR LEGISLATIVE AND CASE HISTORY
A. New York Equitable Distribution Statute
The New York system of property division upon divorce is equitable
distribution. Under this system, the court is able to look beyond title and
consider the circumstances of each case to achieve "fair" property distri-
35. See O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 580-81, 489 N.E.2d 712, 713, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 744.
36. See McGowan v. McGowan, 136 Misc. 2d 225, 230, 518 N.Y.S.2d 346, 350 (Sup. Ct.
1987).
37. Golub, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 18, 1988, at 7, col. 3.
38. Id.
39. See O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 586, 489 N.E.2d 712, 717, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 748; Mc-
Gowan, 136 Misc. 2d at 228, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 348.
40. Golub, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 18, 1988, at 7, col. 3.
41. The term "nonprofessional" in this context refers to a person who holds no specific
professional license or academic degree.
42. Golub, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 18, 1988, at 7, col. 4 to 13, col. 1.
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butions. Thus, all property acquired during the marriage by the husband
and wife, regardless of whether title is in their joint or individual names,
is within the power of the court to equitably distribute. Such a system is
different than that employed in community property jurisdictions, where
the court does not have the inherent flexibility to consider the equities of
each case. In a community property state, any property acquired by
either spouse during the marriage is considered to be jointly owned by
husband and wife with each having a one-half interest. Upon divorce,
the court views the husband and wife as co-owners of all the community
property and in states such as California, divides the property equally.43
The New York equitable distribution statute, section 236," divides
property into marital property and separate property. Marital property
is subject to equitable distribution.4" Under section 236, marital property
is defined as "all property acquired by either or both spouses during the
marriage and before the execution of a separation agreement or the com-
mencement of a matrimonial action, regardless of the form in which title
is held. "46
In enacting this statute, the legislature indicated that it was a re-
sponse to the application of traditional common law theories of property
that resulted in great inequities in marital property divisions.47 Statutory
equitable distribution is a directive wherein all circumstances of the case,
as well as the parties thereto, are considered in making distributive
awards.48 The theory behind equitable distribution is a definition of mar-
riage as "an economic partnership to which both parties contribute as
spouse, parent, wage earner, or homemaker."
49
Although the legislature enacted the concept of equitable distribu-
tion, it left it up to the courts to define marital property and determine
what interests came within that term.50 Among other guidelines, section
236 provides:
the court shall consider ... (6) any equitable claim to, interest
in, or direct or indirect contribution made to the acquisition of
such marital property by the party not having title, including
joint efforts or expenditures and contributions and services as a
spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker, and to the career
43. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 254, 483 (5th ed. 1979).
44. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney 1986).
45. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 234[B][5][c] (McKinney 1986).
46. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236[B][1][c] (McKinney 1986) (emphasis added).
47. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 584-85, 489 N.E.2d 712, 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 747.
48. Assembly Memorandum, 1980 N.Y. Legis. Ann. at 129-30, cited in O'Brien.
49. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 585, 489 N.E.2d at 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 747 (1985).
50. Id.
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or career potential of the other party [and] ... (9) the impossi-
bility or difficulty of evaluating any component, asset or any
interest in a business, corporation or profession. 5'
Additionally, the statute provides that if "the distribution of an interest
in a business, corporation, or profession would be contrary to law," the
court should make a distributive award instead of actually dividing the
property.52
Regarding section 236, the court in O'Brien v. O'Brien, a case in-
volving the equitable distribution of a medical license, stated:
The words mean exactly what they say: that an interest in a
profession or professional career potential is marital property
which may be represented by direct or indirect contributions of
the non-title-holding spouse, including financial contributions
and nonfinancial contributions made by caring for the home
and family.53
Last among the legislative guidelines is a caution that before the
court can equitably distribute intangible property, certain statutory fac-
tors must be satisfied. Foremost among these and particularly relevant
to Golub is the requirement that evidence be presented regarding the
present value of the license, degree, or celebrity status, and the support-
ing spouse's contributions toward its acquisition.54
B. Division of Marital Property: A Survey of New York Cases
The court in O'Brien defined marital property.55 In that case, Mrs.
O'Brien forewent the opportunity to obtain a permanent teaching certifi-
cate to support her husband while he finished college and attended medi-
cal school.56 Two months after Mr. O'Brien received his license to
practice medicine, he filed an action for divorce.57
Mr. O'Brien argued that a professional license could not be consid-
ered marital property because the license did not fall within the tradi-
tional definition of property. A license, he argued, was not something
that had exchange value on the open market; nor could it be sold, as-
signed, or transferred. 8 The supreme court special term held that Mr.
51. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236[B][5][d][6],[9] (McKinney 1986).
52. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236[B][5][e] (McKinney 1986).
53. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 584, 489 N.E.2d at 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
54. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236[B][5][d][1]-[10] (McKinney 1986).
55. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985).
56. Id. at 581, 489 N.E.2d at 713-14, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 744-45.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 586-87, 489 N.E.2d at 717, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
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O'Brien's medical license was marital property.59 The supreme court ap-
pellate division, however, reversed and held that the degree was not mar-
ital property.' The court of appeals disagreed, concluding that: 1) the
argument ignored the legislative purpose to eliminate inequities of com-
mon law property distribution; and 2) it was an overstatement to say that
a professional license could not be considered property even outside the
context of the statute.6' The court held that a professional license is a
valuable property right reflected in the money, effort, and lost opportu-
nity for employment expended in acquiring the degree, the increased
earning capacity it brings its holder, and by the fact that it cannot be
revoked without due process of law.6 2 The court further found that it did
not matter that the license itself had no market value for it could grant
some award in lieu of actual distribution.63
Subsequently, in the New York case Price v. Price, 64 Mrs. Price quit
her job as a registered nurse and went to work full-time for six months at
a business partially owned by her husband. Later, she worked as a pri-
vate duty nurse and then gave up outside employment to stay home as a
parent and homemaker.65 After the commencement of the divorce ac-
tion, Mr. Price became the sole owner of the business.66 The supreme
court special term entered a judgment of divorce, and both Mr. and Mrs.
Price appealed.67 The supreme court appellate division held and the
court of appeals affirmed that because Mrs. Price's contributions or ef-
forts as a homemaker and parent added to the increase in the value of her
husband's business, those contributions warranted a division at divorce
of the increase in Mr. Price's business during the marriage.68
The O'Brien definition of a license as property was extended in 1985
in McGowan v. McGowan. 69 With her husband's financial support, Mrs.
McGowan, a teacher, obtained a Master's Degree during the marriage,
enabling her to increase her earning potential.70 At trial, the issue was
whether an academic degree earned by one spouse with the support of
59. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 576, 489 N.E.2d at 715, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 743.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 586-87, 489 N.E.2d at 717, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 69 N.Y.2d 8, 503 N.E.2d 684, 511 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1986).
65. Id. at 12, 503 N.E.2d at 686, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 221.
66. Id. at 12, 503 N.E.2d at 685-86, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 220-21.
67. Id. at 8, 503 N.E.2d at 684, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
68. Id. at 13, 503 N.E.2d at 686, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 221.
69. 136 Misc. 2d 225, 518 N.Y.S.2d 346 (Sup. 1987).
70. Id. at 226, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 347.
1989]
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
the other during the marriage could be considered marital property.7"
Looking to the O'Brien definition of a license's value as an increase in
earning capacity for its holder, the McGowan court concluded that this
same definition held true for academic degrees. The court viewed the
degrees as "investments in the economic partnership of the marriage and
...the product of the parties' joint efforts."7 2 The court noted that
although the degree itself was not divisible, the income generated by op-
portunities that a degree allows was divisible.73 Therefore, the court or-
dered that the degree be considered a marital asset and that the enhanced
earning capacity it afforded its holder be subject to equitable
distribution.74
V. ANALYSIS
A. Does Golub Promote the Goal of the Statute?
Section 236 of the equitable distribution statute provides that the
court must consider all circumstances and parties so that any distributive
awards will be fair. Applying the legislative goal to the Golub facts, the
court concluded that Berenson's increased celebrity status could be con-
sidered part of the marital property.
The Golub court's conclusion was a correct application of legislative
directives. Support for this proposition comes directly from the language
of section 236, wherein the legislature does not restrict its discussion to
narrow interpretations of the term "marital property." In describing
what marital property is in terms of equitable distribution, the legislature
specified that in regards to the property, "the form in which title is held"
is irrelevant.75 In advising courts on factors to consider in making equi-
table distributions, the legislature included the words "direct or indi-
rect," in reference to a spouse's contributions and "career or career
potential," in reference to what could be divided.7 6 When considering
valuation, the legislature noted in its analysis that it would be necessary
to value those interests parties hold in their "professions." 77 Finally,
when the legislature analyzes distributions of interests, the statute refers
to "an interest in a ... profession."78 Thus, the legislature appears not
71. Id.
72. Id. at 230, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 350.
73. Id. at 228, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 348.
74. McGowan, 136 Misc. 2d at 228, 230, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 348, 350.
75. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236[B][1][c] (McKinney 1986).
76. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236[B][5][d][6] (McKinney 1986).
77. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236[B][5][d][6],[9] (McKinney, 1986).
78. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 [B][5][e] (McKinney 1986).
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only to decrease the form or amount of contribution one spouse needs to
make but also broadens the definition of the increased earning potential
which will be considered marital property.
The statute does not define "professions." Further, the law does not
define "direct" or "indirect" contributions. This necessarily makes it the
court's responsibility to fill in the parameters of the statute. By deciding
that Berenson's celebrity status qualifies as a "profession," the court ap-
pears to be well within the legislative bounds mandated by the words of
section 236.
The Golub court's conclusion is also supported by the legislative in-
tent behind section 236. The legislature adopted equitable distribution as
a response to the inequitable results of common law property classifica-
tions and to allow courts to consider all circumstances and parties in-
volved.7 9 In Golub, the parties and circumstances were crucial in the
court's decision. Regarding Berenson, the court noted that there is a
"proprietary interest in the product of a celebrity's labors" which gives a
celebrity's fame a property nature. 80 The court went on to analogize a
celebrity's right of publicity to the professional goodwill of a business. In
both instances, it is a "name" that becomes a source of revenue. 8' Ac-
cordingly, the court concluded that Berenson's increased celebrity status
could be considered marital property. The legislature intended to give
the courts broad scope in interpreting the statute so that the most equita-
ble dissolution distributions would result.12 The Golub decision satisfied
the legislative directives because the court did not apply a patent formula
but rather considered Berenson's unique position as a nonprofessional
who had an exceptional potential for increased earnings.
Lastly, the Golub court satisfied the legislative mandates in that it
declined to actually divide Berenson's celebrity status. The statute re-
quires that evidence must be presented as to the valuation of the asset
which a party is seeking to have equitably divided as well as that party's
contribution towards attainment of that asset. The correct time to pres-
ent such evidence is at trial. Because Golub waited until the property
division phase to assert his argument that Berenson's increased celebrity
status should be considered marital property and present evidence of his
contributions to her status, the court was correct in declining to consider
Berenson's celebrity status in the distribution.
79. Assembly Memorandum, 1980 N.Y. Legis. Ann. at 129-30, cited in O'Brien.
80. Golub, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 18, 1988, at 7, col. 3.
81. Id. at 7, col. 4.
82. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 593, 489 N.E.2d at 720, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 751.
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B. Golub Comports with O'Brien, McGowan, and Price
The O'Brien rule, that a medical license acquired by one spouse dur-
ing the marriage is part of the marital property and subject to equitable
distribution," was extended by the Golub court. In Golub, the court held
that the increase in the value of Berenson's celebrity status during her
marriage to Golub was marital property.84 Analyzing the Golub facts in
light of the holdings in O'Brien, Price, and McGowan, the holding in
Golub appears to be appropriate. The court carefully analyzed the char-
acteristics set forth in the precedents in terms of considering whether
celebrity status constitutes marital property.85 The court analogized the
value of a license or degree to the ability of a celebrity to commercially
exploit her fame and the increased earning capacity resulting from such
exploitation, and stated that it was logical to include increased celebrity
status as marital property.86 As did the license in O'Brien, Berenson's
celebrity status had traditional property characteristics; celebrity status
can be sold, assigned, or transferred in the sense that a celebrity can
"sell" her name to promote a product.87 Furthermore, in some jurisdic-
tions it has been held that the right to exploit a celebrity's fame can pass
to her heirs.88 Thus, not only does celebrity status have the traditional
characteristics of property, but it can be characterized as a valuable prop-
erty right. The O'Brien court held that one who acquires a license ob-
tains a valuable property right which is reflected in the money, effort, and
lost opportunity for alternate careers or employment.89 This is also true
for an actress or model who acquires a certain status in show business.
The court in O'Brien did not state that the license itself was valua-
ble, but that the increased earning capacity that accompanies the license
was valuable.9" The Golub court held analogously that it was not Beren-
son's increased celebrity status itself that was of value, but rather it was
the increase in earning capacity that accompanied it that was of value.91
Such a finding renders unnecessary Berenson's argument that because
her celebrity status was not a "license" nor was it "professional," it
could not be considered an "investment in human capital subject to equi-
83. Id. at 576, 489 N.E.2d at 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 743.
84. Golub, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 18, 1988, at 13, col. 1.
85. Id. at 7, col. 3-4, 13, col. 1.
86. Id. at 7, col. 3.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 586, 489 N.E.2d at 717, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
90. Id.
91. Golub, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 18, 1988, at 7, col. 3.
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table distribution."92 The value of Berenson's celebrity status did not
come from the mere fact that people saw her as a celebrity, but rather
came from the great earning potential resulting from people viewing her
as a celebrity who would, for example, increase the public's attraction for
a movie or magazine.
Furthermore, the courts in O'Brien and McGowan recognize that
the spouse holding the degree or license may never use that asset to se-
cure work, and even if they do, they will not always be successful. So,
while it is true that show business is volatile, the same can be said about
all occupations.9 a Yet, because one spouse has a degree or a license or
celebrity status, that party will always have the potential for increased
earning capacity. If in gaining that potential the professional or licensed
or celebrated spouse, was in some way aided by the other spouse, then
that "property" is subject to equitable distribution according to New
York precedents.
The Price court held that "any increase in the value of separate
property of a spouse occurring during the marriage which is due in part
to the direct or indirect contributions of the other spouse, may be consid-
ered property."94 The court in Golub found that throughout the mar-
riage, Golub made most of the financial decisions, supervised the marital
home, and assisted in organizing Berenson's career. 9" However, the
court did not find that Golub had given up any of his own career oppor-
tunities to further Berenson's celebrity status or that he had devoted him-
self solely to his family during the marriage. 96 Thus, even had Golub
presented his argument when he should have during trial, because the
court could not directly attribute any increase in Berenson's celebrity
status to his efforts, it still would not have divided her increased status as
part of the marital property.
C. The Effect of Golub on Other Jurisdictions
Surveying different states' definitions of marital property might pro-
vide insight as to how they would respond to expanding marital property
to include celebrity status. Representative cases analyzing spousal inter-
est in professional degrees show that most states do not have statutes
92. Id. at 7, col. 3.
93. Although concededly not as fickle as show business, other professions are subject to
fluctuations. An example is the trial lawyer who loses "the big case," gets very bad press, and
consequently gets no further business.
94. Golub, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 18, 1988, at 7, col. 3. See Price 69 N.Y.2d 8, 503 N.E.2d 684,
511 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1986).
95. Golub, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 18, 1988, at 7, col. 3.
96. Id. at 13, col. 1.
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requiring consideration of spousal contributions.97 Many states, how-
ever, will consider the contributions of one spouse in helping the other
obtain the degree or license when granting alimony or dividing other as-
sets.9" Accordingly, because many states do not even recognize profes-
sional licenses or degrees as marital property, it seems highly improbable
that they would follow Golub and declare celebrity status, property even
more intangible than professional degrees and licenses, as marital
property.
In New Jersey, a court followed the Golub decision in comedian Joe
Piscopo's divorce action.9 9 The superior court judge found that Pis-
copo's celebrity status was property and noted that because the former
Mrs. Piscopo had made significant contributions in helping Piscopo be-
come a celebrity, she was entitled to a division of his celebrity status."°
The value of his celebrity status was included in the overall valuation of
Piscopo's business assets, of which Mrs. Piscopo was awarded forty-eight
percent. 10
In California, a community property state, the supreme court de-
97. D. Freed & T. Walker, Family Law In The Fifty States: An Overview, 21 FAM. L.Q.
488 (Winter 1988).
98. See e.g. Jones v. Jones, 454 So. 2d 1006 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984) (the court refused to
hold "as a matter of law" that a professional degree earned by one spouse with the support of
the other was marital property upon divorce); In re Marriage of Rubinstein, 145 Ill. App. 3d
31, 495 N.E.2d 659 (1986) (a wife who for nine years had been the primary financial supporter
while her husband pursued his medical education was not entitled to any portion of his medi-
cal degree; however, she was entitled to compensation for her contributions); Drapek v.
Drapek, 399 Mass. 240, 503 N.E.2d 946 (1987) (professional degrees, licenses, and the present
value of future earning potential were not property or assets and were therefore not subject to
division); Olah v. Olah, 135 Mich. App. 404, 354 N.W.2d 359 (1984) (husband's medical de-
gree was not property subject to division but the court awarded the wife a lump sum amount
each month until she completed her degree, since she had financed her husband's medical
education); Ruben v. Ruben, 123 N.J. 358, 461 A.2d 733 (1983) (graduate degree of one
spouse acquired during the marriage was not an asset subject to distribution upon dissolution);
Hodge v. Hodge, 337 Pa. Super. 151, 486 A.2d 951 (1984) (an advanced degree was not mari-
tal property subject to equitable distribution under the Pennsylvania divorce code and even if it
was, the increased earning capacity that comes as a result of the attainment of a degree or
license is not included in the category of marital property for the purpose of division); Helm v.
Helm, 289 S.C. 169, 345 S.E.2d 720 (S.C. 1986); Beeler v. Beeler, 715 S.W.2d 625, (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1986); Grosskoph v. Grosskoph, 677 P.2d 814 (Wyo. 1984) (an accounting degree was
not divisible property, but it should be considered with respect to the equities involved); Freed
& Walker, Family Law In The Fifty States: An Overview, 19 FAM. L.Q. at 376-79 (Winter
1986) and 21 FAM. L.Q. at 487-89 (Winter 1988).
99. Joe Piscopo is known for his appearances on the television show Saturday Night Live
and on television commercials for Miller Lite Beer. See Amy Dockser, Celebrity Status Ruled
Property In Divorce Case, Wall St. J., Aug. 26, 1988, at 13, col. 3.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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cided In re Sullivan. 102 In that case, Mr. Sullivan entered medical school
the year after he and Mrs. Sullivan were married. 0 ' After completing
her undergraduate education, Mrs. Sullivan worked various full and
part-time jobs while Mr. Sullivan completed his internship and residency
in Oregon. Upon their return to California, they separated and Mr. Sul-
livan petitioned for divorce."° The superior court entered a dissolution
judgment, but denied Mrs. Sullivan any compensation for her contribu-
tions to her husband's medical education during the marriage.'05 The
California Supreme Court reversed. 10 6 Because the property settlement
of the case would not be finalized until the beginning of the next year, the
court applied an amendment to the California Family Law Act even
though that amendment was not effective until the day after the Sullivan
decision.' 0 7 Section 4800.3 of the California Civil Code provides that if
community contributions to training and education enhance the earning
capacity of the noncontributing spouse, those contributions shall be reim-
bursed to the community. 1 8 Thus, the court held that a wife who put
her husband through medical school should be reimbursed for her contri-
butions towards his medical degree.'
Given that the court in Sullivan was only willing to allow reimburse-
ment in a case involving a professional degree, it does not seem likely
that California courts will decide that celebrity status is property in the
Golub sense. California Civil Code section 4800.3, which the Sullivan
court employed to reach its decision, specifically addresses community
contributions to education and training. The provisions of the statute
specifically discuss community payments for education or training or for
102. 37 Cal. 3d 762, 691 P.2d 1020, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
103. Id. at 765, 691 P.2d at 1021, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 355-57.
104. Id. at 766, 691 P.2d at 1022, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
105. Id.
106. Sullivan, 37 Cal. 3d at 768, 691 P.2d at 1023, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
107. Id. at 767-68, 691 P.2d at 1022-23, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 356-57.
108. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.3(b)(1),(d) (West Supp. 1988). Relevant subsections provide:
(b) Subject to the limitations provided in this section, upon dissolution of marriage
or legal separation:
(1) The community shall be reimbursed for community contributions to education
or training of a party that substantially enhances the earning capacity of the party.
The amount reimbursed shall be with interest at the legal rate, accruing from the end
of the calendar year in which the contributions were made.
(d) Reimbursement for community contributions... pursuant to this section is the
exclusive remedy of the community or a party for the education or training and any
resulting enhancement of the earning capacity of the party. However, nothing in this
subdivision shall limit consideration of the effect of the education, training, or en-
hancement, or the amount reimbursed pursuant to this section, on the circumstances
of the parties for the purpose of an order for support pursuant to Section 4801.
109. Sullivan, 37 Cal. 3d at 768, 691 P.2d at 1023, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
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the repayment of loans incurred by the community toward that end. 1 0
Thus, neither the statute nor Sullivan would be directly applicable in a
fact situation similar to Golub. Applying the Sullivan rule to the Golub
facts, it seems that California courts would deny Golub relief for reasons
similar to the New York court. In Sullivan, one spouse had made eco-
nomic sacrifices to allow the other to obtain an education."1 Golub,
however, did not prove that he had sacrificed to allow Berenson to in-
crease her celebrity status.
VI. CONSEQUENCES
A. Defining an Exceptional Wage Earner
One significant aspect of the court's holding in Golub is that the
court extended marital property to include any person's expertise which
has enabled him or her to become an "exceptional wage earner." The
court, however, did not state a definition or a rule concerning what, ex-
actly, is an "exceptional wage earner." Because there are no definitive
guidelines, subsequent courts presented with facts similar to Golub will
face the problem of determining what an "exceptional wage earner" is on
a case-by-case basis. If and when courts are forced to make such deter-
minations, however, one factor that they must consider is the need for
uniformity so that different interpretations and decisions regarding the
meaning of an "exceptional wage earner" will not result within one juris-
diction. Uniformity could be accomplished through legislative measures.
The legislature could specify a variety of factors that courts should con-
sider to ensure that inequitable definitions are not employed. Included in
the factors would be the socio-economic status as well as the geographic
locations of the parties. Thus, individual circumstances of each case
would be considered in light of specific legislatively mandated factors,
allowing equitable determinations of who is an "exceptional wage
earner."
B. Forum Shopping and Prenuptial Agreements
Because Golub has created a new precedent by defining celebrity sta-
tus as property, a number of repercussions may occur in the show busi-
ness world. If other states follow the lead of New York and New Jersey,
forum shopping may result. Many celebrities are quite wealthy, and in
the age of high divorce rates, are likely to consult attorneys before getting
married. To protect their assets, attorneys may advise celebrities to
110. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800.3(a) (West Supp. 1988).
111. Sullivan, 37 Cal. 3d at 766, 691 P.2d at 1022, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
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marry and reside in states where the law is clear that their celebrity sta-
tus will not be divided in the event of a divorce proceeding.
A possible solution to prevent potential forum shopping may be to
implement a plan whereby in a community property state a value is
placed on a supporting spouse's contributions and the community is re-
imbursed by that amount before the court makes a final property divi-
sion. The community, then, is reimbursed for the value of the supporting
spouse's contributions before assets are divided, rather than allowing the
contributing spouse a separate award. The contributions which would be
valued and then reimbursed would not be those that an "ordinary"
spouse performs, such as housekeeping. For example, a reimbursable
contribution could be that of a spouse who gave up his own career to
manage his wife's career, when his management was the sole or primary
reason that his wife gained celebrity status. In this situation, although
the supporting spouse would probably get less than the amount alluded
to in Golub, at least this method would act as some shield against unjust
enrichment of the celebrity spouse.
To avoid the situation altogether, celebrities may instead decide to
enter into prenuptial agreements. Because good faith prenuptial agree-
ments are usually honored," 2 the celebrity could "contract" before the
marriage not to divide her status upon divorce. Of course, if one spouse's
contributions during a marriage enable the celebrity spouse to obtain a
substantially better financial position than before the marriage, the sup-
porting spouse could claim that the prenuptial agreement was not en-
tered into with complete knowledge and contest its enforcement. The
celebrity, however, would at least have the agreement as concrete evi-
dence on which to fight to preserve her status as indivisible.
C. Problems of Valuation and an Alternative Remedy
Golub did not address the valuation of Berenson's celebrity status.
There are several potential problems a court will have in valuing such
status. In show business, it is almost impossible to attribute fame to any
one factor. Thus, it is difficult to ascertain whether a spouse's contribu-
tions had any effect on the other's celebrity status and if so, how much.
Courts are therefore faced with a question of direct causation.
Another problem in valuation the court will encounter in making a
112. A prenuptial agreement is "an agreement entered into by two people who intend to
marry each other which sets forth the rights of each person in the property of the other in the
event of divorce or death. Generally, entering into marriage constitutes sufficient considera-
tion to make a prenuptial agreement enforceable." BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 359 (2d ed.
1984).
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distributive award is that a celebrity's increase in monetary worth may
not adequately reflect the amount that their celebrity status has in-
creased. Exposure in one film today may lead to many roles in the fu-
ture. Future fame however, is uncertain and cannot be guaranteed.
Thus, any division awarding future earnings of a celebrity to her spouse
is also uncertain. In that sense, Berenson's argument that an increase in
celebrity status is not an investment in human capital has some merit. In
O'Brien and McGowan, the parties retained their academic degrees or
professional licenses. As the court in O'Brien noted, a professional li-
cense is a property right that can only be revoked with due process of
law."' 3 A celebrity's status, however, is not a lifelong attainment and can
be taken away with one critic's pen. A valuation in this instance may be
overstated.
To avoid these and other valuation problems, a court faced with
facts similar to Golub may find it easier as well as more equitable to
employ "reimbursement." In O'Brien, the husband did not begin pursuit
of his medical career until after he and his wife were married. She sup-
ported him, enabling him to obtain his medical degree. Division of his
degree, therefore, seems appropriate. In Golub, however, Berenson had
already obtained celebrity status before her marriage to Golub. Like-
wise, Golub had already obtained a successful law practice as well as
celebrity clients before the marriage. Perhaps this instance calls not for
division of Golub's law practice or Berenson's celebrity status, but reim-
bursement of the supporting spouse's contributions to each as the most
equitable measure since neither of the Golubs could claim to have been
an enabling factor behind the others' "business."
The legislative support for employing such a proposition in Golub
comes from the Domestic Relations Law which states that at times when
a distribution of a business upon divorce would bring inequitable results,
the court should grant an alternate award instead of actually dividing the
property. "4 In the instant case, if Golub had proven that he was actually
responsible for an increase in Berenson's celebrity status because, for ex-
ample, he gave up his own career to manage hers (to his economic detri-
ment), the court could add up all the hours Golub claimed to have
worked in managing Berenson's career, compare these to the time a pro-
fessional manager may have spent (averaging the two accordingly), mul-
tiply that amount by an hourly rate such as that which Golub would
charge one of his legal clients, and award that amount to him for his
contributions to Berenson's career. Similarly, the court could employ a
113. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 586, 489 N.E.2d at 717, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
114. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236[B][5](e] (McKinney 1986).
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comparable formula to compensate Berenson for the amount she contrib-
uted to Golub's practice by taking into account such factors as how
much time she spent entertaining prospective clients or the amount of
media exposure she gave her husband. Though such a method would
also present problems in valuation, it would appear that a more equitable
resolution of the marital property would be achieved without giving
either party a windfall award.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the divorce action of actress Marisa Berenson and attorney A.
Richard Golub, a New York court held that an increase in celebrity sta-
tus during a marriage could be marital property. In so doing, the court
extended a trend that began with the legislative intent behind "equitable
distribution" and continued through such cases as O'Brien, Price, and
McGowan. Although the court's decision may present some future appli-
cation problems in such areas as valuation of a "celebrity status," these
problems need not be insurmountable.
The decision seems to be sound in the policy reflected-that upon
divorce the parties should equitably divide marital assets as if a partner-
ship has just broken up. This policy appears to be legislatively man-
dated. Furthermore, the court's holding is socially reasonable
considering that film and television personalities usually have enormous
earning potential, yet possess no tangible license or degree.
Cynthia M Germano
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